Identifying influential spreaders and efficiently estimating infection
  numbers in epidemic models: a walk counting approach by Bauer, Frank & Lizier, Joseph T.
epl draft
Identifying influential spreaders and efficiently estimating infec-
tion numbers in epidemic models: a walk counting approach
Frank Bauer1 (a) and Joseph T. Lizier1,2
1 Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Inselstrasse 22, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
2 CSIRO Information and Communications Technology Centre, PO Box 76, Epping, NSW 1710, Australia
PACS 87.33.Ge – Dynamics of social networks
PACS 89.75.-k – Complex networks
PACS 64.60.ah – Percolation
Abstract –We introduce a new method to efficiently approximate the number of infections re-
sulting from a given initially-infected node in a network of susceptible individuals. Our approach
is based on counting the number of possible infection walks of various lengths to each other node
in the network. We analytically study the properties of our method, in particular demonstrating
different forms for SIS and SIR disease spreading (e.g. under the SIR model our method counts
self-avoiding walks). In comparison to existing methods to infer the spreading efficiency of differ-
ent nodes in the network (based on degree, k-shell decomposition analysis and different centrality
measures), our method directly considers the spreading process and, as such, is unique in providing
estimation of actual numbers of infections. Crucially, in simulating infections on various real-world
networks with the SIR model, we show that our walks-based method improves the inference of
effectiveness of nodes over a wide range of infection rates compared to existing methods. We also
analyse the trade-off between estimate accuracy and computational cost, showing that the better
accuracy here can still be obtained at a comparable computational cost to other methods.
Introduction. – Epidemic spreading in biological, so-
cial, and technological networks has recently attracted
much attention (see for instance [1–7]). Most of these
studies focus on the following question: Assume that we
first infect a randomly chosen individual of the network
(patient zero) - how likely is it that a substantial part of
the network will be infected? In these earlier approaches
the network was considered as a whole and the role of pa-
tient zero on the disease spreading process was neglected.
In this letter, we consider the role a single individual
plays in the spreading process rather than the global prop-
erties of the network. It is of particular interest to identify
the most influential spreaders, and to do so without ex-
pensive simulations. This knowledge could, for instance,
be used to prioritise vaccinations for the most influential
spreaders. The number of neighbours of an individual is
a simple but crude approximation for an individual’s in-
fluence, and one has to take further topological properties
of the network into account to understand the spreading
process adequately [8, 9]. As such, [5, 8, 9] propose dif-
ferent inference measures for a node’s spreading influence
(a)E-mail: bauer@mis.mpg.de, joseph.lizier@csiro.au
such as the k-shell decomposition, the local centrality mea-
sure or eigenvector centrality.1 All of these approaches
show strong correlations between their measure of influ-
ence and the (simulated) number of infected nodes. There
is potential for improvement however in: i. considering
network features encountered by longer infection walks,
and ii. addressing the ultimate goal of estimating the ex-
pected number of infections rather than merely obtaining
correlations. Importantly, one can only predict whether
an infection will be epidemic (i.e. a large portion of the
network will be infected) or harmless from an estimate of
infection numbers, not from correlation scores of an infer-
ence method alone. In this letter, we present an approach
based on counting the number of potential infection walks
from a given initially infected individual. Our method
overcomes the above issues and allows us to consistently
estimate with very good accuracy the expected number of
infections from each patient zero. Moreover, our method
is very efficient and has low computational costs.
1For directed networks other methods exist for ranking the in-
fluence of nodes in different dynamical contexts (e.g. ranking re-
searchers according to influence on the scientific community [10–12].)
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The general model. – We consider epidemic spread-
ing on network structures. A complex network can be
identified with a graph Γ = (V,E) 2 (here V is the vertex
and E is the edge set) in an obvious way. We say that i
and j are neighbours, in symbols i ∼ j, if they are con-
nected by an edge. In general, we deal with undirected
graphs, though our formulae are trivially extended for the
directed case. Often it is convenient to describe a graph by
its adjacency matrix A = (aij)i,j=1,...,|V | where the matrix
element aij = 1 if i and j are neighbours and zero oth-
erwise, and |V | is the number of vertices. Furthermore,
di =
∑
j aij denotes the (out) degree of the vertex i.
First we consider a generalization of the SIS
(susceptible/infected/susceptible)-model and the SIR
(susceptible/infected/removed)-model. In our model a
disease is spread in a network through contact between
infected (ill) individuals and susceptible (healthy) indi-
viduals. At a given time step, each infected individual
will infect each of its susceptible neighbours with a given
probability 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 (for simplicity we assume that β is
the same for all pairs of vertices - however generalization
to variable βij is straightforward). An infected individual
will be removed from the network with probability (1−λ)
(modelling either death or full recovery with immunity);
otherwise, an infected individual remains in the network
with probability λ and remains susceptible to (re)infection
at the (very) next time step. For λ = 0 and λ = 1 this
model reduces to the SIR and SIS model, respectively.3
For a given network, we want to find the expected num-
ber of infections given the person that was infected first.
It is natural to think of the spreading process in terms of
infection walks in the corresponding graph. The degree of
a vertex is a first indicator of how many individuals it will
infect, however this neglects all infection walks of length
greater than one - see also [9] where the role of longer infec-
tion walks in epidemic spreading is discussed and numer-
ical simulations were performed.4 Moreover such walks
play a very important role in the dynamics of complex
networks. In the following we will show that it is crucial
to also take longer infection walks into account in order to
get precise results.
The probability p(i, j, k) that vertex j is infected
through a walk of length k given that the infection started
at vertex i can be written as
p(i, j, k) = pinf(i, j, k)psus(i, j, k), (1)
2For simplicity, we do not allow self-loops or multiple edges.
3 This is slightly different to the usual discrete-time SIS model,
where infected individuals must return to susceptible at the next
time step before reinfection is possible. In our interpretation, all non-
removed nodes are susceptible (i.e. infected and susceptible are not
mutually exclusive). This difference allows us to mathematically
generalise and study smooth transitions from the SIR to the SIS
model, using the walk-counting approach.
4 This study used walk counts from a source node as a predictor
of spreading efficiency. However, unlike the technique we present
it did not convert those counts into a direct estimate of infection
numbers, nor did it consider the appropriate types of walks (i.e. one
must consider self-avoiding walks for the SIR model).
where pinf(i, j, k) is the probability that vertex j is infected
at time k given that vertex j is susceptible at time k, and
psus(i, j, k) is the probability that vertex j is susceptible
(i.e. not removed) at time k, both given that the infec-
tion started at vertex i. (We refer to time here since the
spreading process is updated at discrete time steps; hence
it is equivalent to say that vertex j is infected through a
walk of length k or infected at time k).
For general graph topologies it is difficult and expen-
sive to calculate the p(i, j, k) exactly. In the subsequent
analysis we show how each of pinf(i, j, k) and psus(i, j, k)
in turn can be approximated when we make the following
reasonable simplification assumption: We assume that all
infection walks (of the same as well as different lengths)
are independent of each other, i.e. we treat them as if
they have no edges in common.5 As our simulation re-
sults indicate, this is a reasonable approximation. Using
this independent walk assumption, we approximate:
pinf(i, j, k) ≈ qinf(i, j, k) = 1−
∏
Pm∈P(i,j,k)
(1− p(Pm)).
P(i, j, k) is the set of all walks from i to j of length k
and p(Pm) is the probability that the infection takes place
along the walk Pm. This formula is easily obtained by
noting that
∏
Pm∈P(i,j,k)(1−p(Pm)) is the probability that
j is not infected at time k given that it was susceptible
and that the infection started at vertex i. It is insightful
to rewrite the last equation in the following form:
qinf(i, j, k) = 1−
k−1∏
l=0
(1− λlβk)sk,lij (2)
where sk,lij is the number of walks from i to j of length k
with l repeated vertices, i.e. the number of walks consist-
ing of k + 1− l different vertices (including i and j).
Let us have a closer look at the relationship be-
tween pinf(i, j, k) and qinf(i, j, k). To properly com-
pute pinf(i, j, k), one must compute infection probabili-
ties on each walk Pm in some order, and properly con-
dition these infection probabilities on those of overlap-
ping previously considered walk in {P1, P2, . . . , Pm−1}.
This leads to properly conditioned infection probabilities
p(Pm|P1, P2, . . . , Pm−1) and the expression:
pinf(i, j, k) = 1−
∏
Pm∈P(i,j,k)
(1− p(Pm|P1, P2, . . . , Pm−1)).
Now, if infection has not already occurred on one of
these previously considered walks {P1, P2, . . . , Pm−1},
then pinf(i, j, k) only differs from qinf(i, j, k) where Pm
has any overlapping edges with {P1, P2, . . . , Pm−1}. Since
infection did not occur on any of these walks with
shared edges, then some of the shared edges for the
5For walk lengths less than or equal to two this assumption is not
needed since all walks are independent anyway.
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walk Pm may in fact already be closed (i.e. dropping
p(Pm|P1, P2, . . . , Pm−1) below p(Pm)). This yields:
pinf(i, j, k) ≤ qinf(i, j, k) for all k, (3)
i.e. the independent walk assumption leads to an overes-
timation of pinf(i, j, k).
Let us now study psus(i, j, k) in more detail. We intro-
duce prem(i, j, k) := 1 − psus(i, j, k), (see footnote 3) i.e.
the probability that vertex j is removed at time k given
the infection started at vertex i. For all t ≥ 1, we have:
prem(i, j, t+ 1) = prem(i, j, t) + psus(i, j, t)pinf(i, j, t)(1−λ)
=⇒ psus(i, j, t+ 1)− psus(i, j, t) = −(1− λ)p(i, j, t) (4)
Summing (4) over all t from 1 to k − 1 we obtain:
psus(i, j, k) = 1− (1− λ)
k−1∑
t=1
p(i, j, t), (5)
where we used psus(i, j, 1) = 1. As before, we use the in-
dependent walk assumption to approximate psus(i, j, k) by
qsus(i, j, k), and also p(i, j, k) by q(i, j, k) where we define:
q(i, j, k) := qinf(i, j, k)qsus(i, j, k). (6)
So by analogy to (5) we define:
qsus(i, j, k) := 1− (1− λ)
k−1∑
t=1
q(i, j, t), ∀k. (7)
We observe that qsus satisfies an equation similar to (4):
qsus(i, j, k) = qsus(i, j, k − 1)− (1− λ)q(i, j, k − 1).
We then consider the connection between psus(i, j, k) and
qsus(i, j, k). In order to investigate this we note that walks
of length one and two always satisfy the independence
assumption. Hence we have pinf(i, j, k) = qinf(i, j, k) and
psus(i, j, k) = qsus(i, j, k) for k = 1, 2.
Now we will prove by induction that psus(i, j, t) ≥
qsus(i, j, t) for all t. First we assume this is true for t = k
(as demonstrated for k = 1, 2 above). Then considering
t = k + 1, combining (1) and (4) we have:
psus(i, j, k + 1) = psus(i, j, k)(1− (1− λ)pinf(i, j, k))
≥ qsus(i, j, k)(1− (1− λ)qinf(i, j, k))
= qsus(i, j, k + 1),
where we used (3) and our inductive assumption
psus(i, j, k) ≥ qsus(i, j, k). Hence we conclude that:
psus(i, j, k) ≥ qsus(i, j, k) ∀k. (8)
That is, we systematically underestimate the probability
psus of being susceptible. Together with the observation
that we systematically overestimate the probability of be-
ing infected in (3), these opposite effects of our indepen-
dent walks assumption may balance each other in (6).
We define the impact of vertex i (the estimated number
of infections given that vertex i was infected first) as
Ii := lim
L→∞
Ii(L) = lim
L→∞
L∑
k=1
∑
j
q(i, j, k).
Ii counts the total number of infections, and so is not re-
quired to converge if λ > 0 since then some of the vertices
might be infected several times. Alternatively some other
studies define outbreak size as the number of nodes in-
fected at least once, though this does not inform one as
to whether the infection will die out or not. (Note that
if the nodes cannot be infected several times, i.e. for the
SIR model, both aforementioned quantities coincide.) It
is easy to verify that in considering only walks of length 1,
the impact of vertex i is Ii(L = 1) = βdi. This shows that
the degree di of vertex i is the first order approximation of
the impact Ii. In order to calculate the q(i, j, k) we need
to know all the sk,lij . The calculation of s
k,l
ij from i to all j
can be completed in O(Dk) steps (average case of counting
walks along homogeneous out-degree D nodes with inde-
pendent edges), and is the computational-time bottleneck
for our method. (We propose later an asymptotically more
efficient calculation for the SIS case). Crucially, while this
asymptotic scaling is the same as for simulating the disease
spreading process, the constant factor of proportionality
for our technique is smaller by several magnitudes.6
In the following, we restrict ourselves to the special cases
λ = 0, 1 where we obtain the SIR and SIS models.
The SIS-model. – The SIS model corresponds to
the case λ = 1, i.e. where infected nodes always become
susceptible again (i.e. do not die or become immune).
Examples of SIS-type disease spreading include computer
viruses and pests in agriculture where the individuals
(computer/crops) do not develop immunity against the
disease and hence can be re-infected again.
To compute qinf(i, j, k > 1), one has to count the num-
ber skij of different walks of length k between i and j, i.e.
the number of possible infection walks with any number
of repeated vertices l. Crucially, skij is given by the ij-
th entry of the k-th power Ak of the adjacency matrix
A, which is computed in low-order polynomial time, mak-
ing our method asymptotically much more efficient than
simulations for the SIS special case. By equation (2) the
probability p(i, j, k) that j is infected by i through a walk
of length k is then approximated by (with λ = 1):
q(i, j, k) = 1− (1− βk)skij , (9)
6 The expected number of evaluations e per simulation consists
of D evaluations of disease spread to each neighbour plus the same
expected number of evaluations e per Dβ infected neighbour (on
average, in the sub-critical regime); i.e. e = D + Dβe. One can
solve e = D/(1−Dβ), but it is more useful to write this to limited
walk length k as O(Dkβk−1). Crucially, we require the number of
repeat simulations to be  1/βk−1 for proper sampling, and new
simulations are required for each β. These two requirements push the
constant factor orders of magnitude beyond that for our technique
since we only need to calculate the SAWs once for all β.
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where we used qsus(i, j, k) = 1 since λ = 1 here. We obtain:
ISISi = lim
L→∞
L∑
k=1
∑
j∈V
1− (1− βk)skij (10)
(using 00 = 1 by convention if we allow β = 1). Again we
point out that this expression might not converge (partic-
ularly if β is too large) since individuals can be infected
several times. Such divergence has a meaningful interpre-
tation: i.e. that the infection will remain forever in the
network and will not die out. In (10) we take arbitrarily
long walks into account since the vertices cannot develop
immunity against the disease and so no upper bound for
the maximal length of an infection walk exists.
For other diseases it is more natural to assume that the
vertices can develop immunity after infection.
The SIR-model. – The SIR model corresponds to
the case λ = 0, i.e. where infected nodes never become sus-
ceptible again after infection as the individuals develop im-
munity or die. As far as infection spreading is concerned,
they are considered removed (i.e. they cannot spread the
virus, nor be reinfected). Examples of SIR-type disease
spreading include most diseases spread among humans.
Since a vertex cannot be infected twice, we have to mod-
ify our previous considerations appropriately. Instead of
general walks we now have to consider self-avoiding walks
(SAWs) or paths. Indeed, it has been previously suggested
that an understanding of SAWs would be useful in epi-
demiology [13], though this was not properly investigated.
It is well known that, compared to counting walks, it is
much more difficult to count SAWs in a graph [14]. How-
ever, instead of explicitly calculating the number of SAWs
one can obtain the number of SAWs recursively [15]. In
particular, the number of SAWs from i to j of length k+1
is given by:
sk+1,0ij (Γ) =
∑
g:g∼j in Γ
sk,0ig (Γ \ j),
for k ≥ 1 where sk,0ig (Γ \ j) is the number of SAWs from i
to a neighbour g of j (in Γ) of length k in the graph that is
obtained from Γ by removing the vertex j. The adjacency
matrix of the graph Γ \ j is obtained from the adjacency
matrix of Γ by deleting the j-th row and column.
Noting that there cannot exist a SAW of length k >
|V | − 1, we obtain for the overall expected number of in-
fected vertices starting from vertex i (with λ = 0):
ISIRi =
|V |−1∑
k=1
∑
j∈V
(
1− (1− βk)sk,0ij
)(
1−
k−1∑
t=1
q(i, j, t)
)
.
(11)
We write ISIRi (L) to represent estimates with the sum
over paths k limited to maximum path length L.
Simulation results. – We provide a brief application
of our technique to simulations of SIR spreading phenom-
ena using: a. the social network structure generated from
email interactions between employees of a university [16]
(giant-component with 1133 nodes and 5451 undirected
edges, diameter 8); b. the structure of the C. elegans neu-
ral network [17, 18] (297 nodes and 2345 directed edges)
to demonstrate a directed network, and c. the collabora-
tion network of the arXiv cond-mat repository [19] (giant-
component with 27519 nodes, 116181 undirected edges,
diameter 16) to demonstrate a larger network.
For each network, we compute estimates ISIRi (L) from
(11) for maximum (self-avoiding) walk lengths L = 1 to 7
(max. of 5 for the cond-mat network), with variable in-
fection rate β, for each patient zero i. To investigate the
accuracy of these estimates, we also compute numbers of
infections for each patient zero i and β as averages SSIRi
over 1000 simulations (10000 for the cond-mat network).
Furthermore, to compare the accuracy of inferences of the
relative effectiveness of each node, we have also measured
the k-shell [8] and eigenvector centrality for each node in
the network (these measures were suggested as useful in-
ferrers of relative spreading efficiency from each node in
[8] and [9]). Using Java code on a 2.0 GHz Intel Xeon
CPU E5-2650, the 10000 simulations SSIRi for all nodes
and β values were completed for the cond-mat network
in around 2000 hours; our estimates ISIRi (L) were com-
pleted for L = 4 and 5 in 30 and 60 minutes respectively;
while with Matlab scripts the degree and eigenvector cen-
trality were completed in less than one second each and
k-shell computed in less than 30 seconds. We note that
computation of the relevant walks skij for SIS models is
significantly more efficient than for SIR, since they can
be directly computed from Ak (as described earlier). We
chose to perform SIR simulations here in order to provide
a greater computational challenge for our technique.
The extent to which our estimates accurately represent
the relative spreading effectiveness from each patient zero
is examined via the correlation of estimates ISIRi (L) to
simulated results SSIRi for the various networks in Fig. 1,
as well as via their rank order correlations (defined in [9]).
These figures demonstrate that our estimates ISIRi (L)
consistently provide very accurate assessment of relative
spreading effectiveness of the nodes over large ranges of β
for all networks examined, in particular for L > 1 and for
β values in the sub-critical, critical, and the lower-end of
the super-critical spreading regimes. (Critical spreading is
defined as β = βc = 1/αmax [9], where αmax is the largest
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A. Fig. 1 indicates βc
and also β−3dB where 30 % of the network is infected on
average (upper super-critical regime) - the number of in-
fections continue to increase very quickly beyond this β).
The correlation results for ISIRi (L) generally improve as
L increases. Estimates up to only short path lengths L do
not properly capture the effects of spreading on the net-
work structure further away from patient zero when these
nodes become more vulnerable at larger β. In particular,
L = 1 captures only the out-degree of the initially infected
node, and therefore does not represent any network struc-
ture more than one hop away. In general then, one faces
p-4
Identifying influential spreaders and estimating infection numbers
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
 0.01  0.1
Co
rre
la
tio
n
β
(a) Email correlation
0.90
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
 0.01  0.1
R
an
k 
or
de
r c
or
re
la
tio
n
β
(b) Email rank order correlation
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
 0.01  0.1
Co
rre
la
tio
n
β
(c) C. elegans correlation
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
 0.01  0.1
R
an
k 
or
de
r c
or
re
la
tio
n
β
(d) C. elegans rank order corr.
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
 0.001  0.01  0.1
Co
rre
la
tio
n
β
(e) Cond-mat correlation
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
 0.001  0.01  0.1
R
an
k 
or
de
r c
or
re
la
tio
n
β
(f) Cond-mat rank order corr.
Fig. 1: Correlations and rank order correlations of various esti-
mates of spreading effectiveness to simulated infection numbers
on the structures of the email interaction, C. elegans neural
and cond-mat networks. Results are plotted for estimates ob-
tained using k-shells (red circles), eigenvector centrality (pur-
ple diamonds), out-degree or ISIRi (L = 1) (blue triangles),
our estimation technique ISIRi (L) using self-avoiding walks of
length L = 2 to 5 for cond-mat and 7 for the other networks
(greyscale ×, darker gray-black to indicate longer walk lengths
L), and for estimates from smaller numbers of simulations (10,
100 and 1000, which increase in accuracy) for the cond-mat net-
work only (green +). Vertical (left) green lines indicate critical
spreading at βc and (right) red lines indicate β−3dB with 30 %
of network infected on average.
a trade-off between accuracy of inference of effectiveness
against shorter computational time. Importantly though,
very good results can be obtained with short path lengths
L, with the results from L = 4 say being almost indistin-
guishable from longer L for most of the range of β. This is
a crucial point, since the runtime for the computations for
L ≤ 4 is much faster than simulations, and is on the order
of the runtimes for the more simple degree (L = 1) and
k-shell inference methods for the small networks. Finally,
we note that the accuracy of the method drops once β is
well-inside the super-critical regime (even for large L) due
to: i. insufficient path length at high β, ii. our indepen-
dent walks assumption becomes less valid at high L and
β, and iii. with most nodes infecting a large proportion of
the network, the structure surrounding each node makes
less of an impact on the spreading efficiency.
Crucially, the accuracy achieved by our ISIRi (L) can
only be matched by large numbers of simulations, which
take significantly longer runtime. Fig. 1 shows that, for
the cond-mat network, using only 10 repeat simulations
(with runtime double that of ISIRi (L = 5)) provides much
worse correlations, while comparable correlations up to the
lower super-critical regime can only be achieved with 1000
simulations which cost around 200× more runtime. As
deduced earlier, our technique has asymptotically faster
runtime by a significant constant factor.
Further, our estimates ISIRi (L) are consistently more
accurate with L ≥ 2 than the k-shell inference, for β values
in the sub-critical, critical and early super-critical regimes.
A similar conclusion holds against the eigenvalue central-
ity measure of [9], for all but a couple of β values near
the critical regime in Fig. 1(f); indeed, eigenvector cen-
trality only achieves comparable accuracy near the criti-
cal regime. These are crucial results covering the regimes
of importance (since in the deeper super-critical regime,
a large proportion of the network becomes infected and
understanding the spreading efficiency of various initially
infected nodes becomes less important). Though our esti-
mates are less efficient than k-shell or eigenvalue central-
ity, they are still much faster than simulations, and these
results suggest a strong advantage to using ISIRi (L).
Additionally, we emphasise that while other tools such
as the k-shell and eigenvector centrality are useful for in-
ferring the relative spreading effectiveness of each node,
they do not actually estimate the number of infections
from each node. This is a distinct feature of our approach
as compared to these other methods. In Fig. 2 we directly
compare our estimates ISIRi (L) to the simulated values
SSIRi for each node i, for several values of β. This clearly
shows that our technique provides reasonable estimates of
the expected number of infections across the sub-critical
spreading regime and up to criticality for L ≥ 4. Indeed,
reasonable accuracy can still be obtained with larger L
into the critical regime, though the time-efficiency bene-
fits of doing so (as compared to simulation) declines.
Fig. 2 also demonstrates quite well the manner in which
estimates improve (in general) with increasing maximum
considered path length L. We see that, while using too
small a maximum path length L appears to be the largest
contributor to the inaccuracy of ISIRi (L) (serving to pull
points above the line SSIRi = I
SIR
i (L)), other errors are in-
troduced by our approximations in (3) and (8) (the former
of which pulls the points below this line by overestimating
the probability of infection). As previously stated though,
for reasonable β and large enough L, these errors seem to
roughly cancel. Importantly also, while the correlation of
estimates to simulated infection numbers may not always
increase with L in the supercritical regime, larger L values
provide consistently more accurate estimates of infection
numbers (e.g. see β = 0.12 in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).
Finally, we consider a simple heuristic to determine an
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Fig. 2: Simulated SSIRi versus estimated I
SIR
i (L) infection numbers, for each patient zero and maximum path lengths L = 1
to 7, using the email interaction network structure. The straight green line represents the ideal plot SSIRi = I
SIR
i (L).
appropriate L length to use. For potential infection walks
from patient zero of length L, and for small β in the sub-
critical regime (in particular with doβ < 1), one can make
a naive estimate of the expected numbers of infections at
length L as (doβ)
L, where do is the average out-degree of
the network. One can then compute minimum L values
to keep (doβ)
L below a given value r. For instance, in the
email network (with do = 9.62), using r = 0.02 suggests
that with L ≥ 4 and β ≤ 0.039 we will only neglect infec-
tions on walk lengths where the expected number of infec-
tions was below 0.02. Of course, this is a simple estimate,
neglecting the effects of dependent walks and making an
implicit assumption that this r = 0.02 is not large enough
to significantly alter the number of infections; however it,
along with observing from the diameters that many walks
can be captured with L = 4, helps to explain why L = 4
provides good results even as β approaches criticality.
Conclusions. – We have presented a method for effi-
ciently estimating the number of resulting infections from
a given initially infected node in a network model. This
technique focusses on counting the number of functional
walks to each candidate for infection, and in SIR mod-
els the only type of walks of interest are self-avoiding
walks. Our technique is distinct from other recently pro-
posed measures to infer spreading effectiveness of each
node because it focusses specifically on disease spreading
walks rather than general measures of network topology.
We demonstrated our technique to provide consistently
more accurate inference of spreading effectiveness than
other candidate techniques such as k-shells up to the lower
super-critical regime. This accuracy improvement is ob-
tainable in reasonable computational time for SIR models,
while still more accurate assessment can be obtained by
increasing the computational time, and faster assessment
can be made for SIS models. Our technique is also distin-
guished in specifically estimating the number of infections,
and we demonstrated that these estimates are reasonably
accurate over a large range of β for large enough values of
the maximum counted walk lengths L.
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